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Labor Market Adjustment: Is Russia Different? 
 
The paper discusses how the Russian labor market has been evolving over two decades of 
the transition. It starts with tracing key labor market indicators such as employment, 
unemployment, labor force participation, working hours, and real wages. Their dynamics 
indicate that the labor market tends to operate in a non-conventional fashion and far from the 
patterns expected initially. The authors argue that the current Russian labor market 
represents a peculiar model that is different from what is observed in the rest of Europe 
outside of the CIS. Having established this, they look at the institutional foundations that 
make this unconventional performance possible and proceed with discussing political 
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1. An Adjustment Puzzle
1 
Before the transition started there was nearly  a consensus among experts and politicians 
about how the Russian labor market would likely evolve in case of a radical economic change. 
Nobody  doubted  that  a  complete  collapse  of  old  economic  structures  designed  by  the  central 
planners would be inevitable. As a consequence, this would bring drastic displacement of workers 
and the rapid arrival of high and prolonged unemployment. The first experience of earlier reformers 
like Poland provided visible and practical arguments in support of this view. Political and social 
implications of such developments in an economy that was strongly distorted and overindustrialized 
but  had  no  unemployment-related  social  experience  were  expected  to  be  dramatic  if  not 
catastrophic. This simple calculus determined the dominant attitude of much of the Soviet political 
elite  in  the  late  80s  as  well  as  of  the  Russian  authorities  later  throughout  the  transition.  The 
expectation of high unemployment in Russia was also shared by almost all influential international 
experts. Predictions of unemployment reaching 25% of the labor force were at that time standard 
and frequent.
2 Two major implications followed from this. On the one hand, high unemployment 
was considered part of the total transition costs borne by the population and all agreed that it should 
be cushioned; on the other, its arrival could be considered as a credible signal that the radical reform 
had taken off.  
The real story took, however, a completely different route. Most of the early forecasts were 
contradicted by actual developments and later predictions did not come true either. In short, the 
                                                 
1 Financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation within the project ―The political economy of 
labor  market  reform  in  transition  economies:  a  comparative  perspective‖  and  from  the  HSE 
Research Program is acknowledged. The authors are grateful to D.Treisman and A.Lukyanova for 
comments and suggestions.  
2 Most international and Russian experts strongly believed that a sharp jump in open unemployment 
was unavoidable. An influential study of Soviet economy in late 80s expected the unemployment 
rate to reach 12 millions by the end of 1992 in case of a modestly optimistic scenario and 13 -15 
millions if things would go worse  (IMF,  World Bank, OECD and EBRD. A Study of Soviet 
Economy. P., 1991, vol. 2). In November 1991, the then Labor Minister A.Shokhin predicted that 
about 30 millions of Russian workers would lose jobs over the first reform year,  while half of them 
would be destined for long-term unemployment. (Cited by: Clarke, 1998a).    2 
unprecedented fall in output that took place was not matched by employment adjustment of similar 
scale. Employment declined but in a piecemeal fashion; unemployment was on the rise but gradually 
as well. Meanwhile, wages fell dramatically, making a puzzling contrast with the famous wage 
rigidity axiom. This – unexpected - combination of flexible wages and relatively stable (or, more 
accurately, highly inertial) employment became a long-term distinctive feature of the Russian labor 
market for years to come. Dubbed by R. Layard [Layard and Richter, 1994] ―the Russian way in 
labor market adjustment‖, this model has survived a number of negative and positive shocks and 
remained largely in action through the 20 years of transition. Very impressive GDP growth in the 
2000s sped up wage increase but did not bring proportionately more jobs. The reaction of wages to 
growing output clearly dominated any employment response. This model was once again put to the 
test by the recent 2008-09 crisis. It passed the test successfully: labor market outcomes diverted 
once again from the predicted trajectory. Employment losses, given the GDP fall, were much more 
modest than those expected while downward wage adjustment was not negligible. It seems safe to 
say that though macroeconomic shocks were different in their nature and causes, the reactions to 
them were surprisingly similar. 
The idea of a peculiar adjustment model was taken up by a few scholars and got empirical 
support  in  a  number  of  studies
3  [Layard, Richter,  1995b;  Commander,  Tolstopiatenko,  1996; 
Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2000; Gimpelson, 2001; Kapelyushnikov, 2001;  Boeri, Terrell, 2002; 
World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2005]. Finally, the OECD accepted this as a major story line in the 
recent labor market and social policy review of the Russian Federation [OECD, forthcoming, 2011].  
This chapter explores the evolution of the Russian labor market trying to deconstruct its 
major determinants and potential implications. In order to unveil the puzzle, we analyze how the 
Russian labor market has been evolving over time in its major dimensions and what has been 
shaping these developments. Why was this evolution different (if it was) from what was initially 
expected by analysts and actually observed in many other transition countries? How did existing 
labor market institutions contribute to shaping the pattern and to making it so persistent over time? 
What were some political economy preconditions and consequences?  These issues are discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
                                                 
3 For convenience we label it as "the Russian model", though in most of the CIS countries national 
labor markets operate to a large extent in a similar way [Commander, Tolstopyatenko, 1997; Boeri, 
Terrel, 2002].   3 
 
 
2. A Concise History of the Russian Labor Market Ups and Downs  
There were three stages in the evolution of the Russian labor market, marked by radical 
shifts in the prevailing macroeconomic regime. The first lasted from 1991 to 1998 and reflected the 
deep  transformational  recession  that  Russia  went  through.  This  recession  caused  a  decline  in 
employment, cuts in working hours, and sharp falls in real wages. The second one (1999-2008) saw 
the dynamic post-recession recovery and a rapid improvement in labor market performance. Finally, 
the economic crisis of 2008 initiated the third stage, the major properties and final outcomes of 
which were not completely clear at the moment of writing this paper. In this section we will trace, 
first, how the Russian labor market evolved and functioned over the period of 1992-2008 and, then, 
consider the recent (post-2008) tendencies in more details.  
Stable Employment, Low Unemployment 
The stylized picture of how the Russian labor market has been performing is presented in 
Fig. 1. It displays changes in GDP, total employment, hours actually worked and the real wage over 
the whole period of 1991-2009. Employment has always  remained relatively stable and weakly 
responsive to  any major macroeconomic shocks. The transformational recession in  the 90s  was 
accompanied by a drastic decline in GDP by 40% (at the trough of the 1998 crisis compared to 
1991) but brought employment down by less than 15%. In other words, each percentage point of lost 
GDP caused employment downsizing by only 0.3-0.35 pp. This contrasted with most of the CEE 
countries,  where the  employment  change followed the  GDP change quite closely [Commander, 
Tolstopiatenko, 1996; World Bank, 2005]. The economic recovery in the 2000s brought the same 
asymmetry. While GDP almost doubled by 2008 (relative to 1998), total employment gained 7-8%.
4 
Low sensitivity of employment to fluctuations in output emerges as a major ―trade mark‖ of the 
Russian labor market.  
As a result, the employment to population ratio (e/p ratio or employment level) has remained 
unexpectedly high (Fig. 2). It decreased initially by 13 pp from 71.8% to 58.4% but then – during 
the recovery period - reached 69%, gaining over 10 pp. This puts the Russian employment level a 
little above the OECD average and significantly above the average for other post-socialist countries.  
If employment remains high and relatively stable, one might expect unemployment to be 
effectively contained. Fig.3 provides visual support for this expectation. Unemployment did not 
                                                 
4 At the same time, the corporate sector continued to downsize!   4 
shoot up in Russia even in the worst economic downturns. It always moved gradually without any 
sharp jumps, which could be caused by mass layoffs if the latter were used. Having started from 
5.2% in 1992, total unemployment (by the ILO definition) surpassed 10% only after 6 years of 
protracted recession and reached (for a short period) its peak value of 13.3% in 1998. However, it 
has never approached peak values typical for some other transition economies (Fig. 4), despite much 
longer  and  deeper  recession.  Given  the  extraordinary  depth  and  length  of  the  transformational 
recession in Russia, it is hard to deny that unemployment has remained disproportionately low. The 
post-crisis (1998) recovery launched a fast decline in unemployment, which more than halved by 
mid-2008, having reached a decent level of 5.5-6%.
5  
This performance was so counterintuitive that a search for measurement errors emerged as 
the first reaction. Initially, low unemployment in Russia was inter preted by some analysts as a 
statistical artifact and attributed largely to poor quality measurement or to the inapplicability of the 
conventional ILO definition to transition economies (Standing, 1996). This hypothesis however did 
not pass an empirical test (Brown et al, 2006). The Russian unemployment estimates appeared to be 
quite robust to any modifications in definitions and measurement. Alternative estimates based on 
broader and more relaxed definitions stayed very close to the then official Goskomstat measures.
6 
Using claimant (registered) unemployment brings an even bigger surprise since this measure 
has always been extraordinary low. During the period of 1990-2000, it fluctuated within the narrow 
band of 1-4% and had fallen under 2% by mid-2008 (Fig 3). None of the CEE countries could boast 
such persistently low registered unemployment (Fig.5).  
The gap between these two measures of unemployment (the registration -based and the 
survey-based) has been large and persistent over time. It has never shrunk  to less than three times 
but reached seven times in some periods (Fig. 3). Even more interesting is the fact that these 
unemployment measures moved along non -coincident trajectories. The first one reached its peak 
(3.6%) in 1996 and then started to decline, while the second one kept growing for two more years 
and reached its peak (13.3%) only in 1998. In other words, the number of the registered unemployed 
started to decline at a time when the number of the ILO unemployed was still rising. There were also 
sub-periods with the opposite dynamics. After 1998, the general unemployment rate sometimes 
                                                 
5 For comparison: in Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, the unemployment rate was close to 20% over 
most of the 2000s. 
6  This was not the case how ever with alternative estimates for two other transition countries  -
Romania and Estonia which moved markedly away from the official ones (Brown et al., 2006).   5 
declined while the registered unemployment rate was rising. (Kapelyushnikov (2002) explores why 
these indicators diverged so much). 
Low Inter-Firm Labor  Mobility? 
Another tentative explanation for employment stability invoked supposedly low inter-firm 
labor mobility and emphasized existing barriers, some of which were inherited from the Soviet past. 
According to this view, low unemployment emerged as an equilibrium outcome of the interaction 
between dependent workers and paternalistic employers. Russian workers were deeply afraid of 
entering the external labor market mostly because they highly valued firm-provided social benefits. 
Therefore, on the supply side, they did their best to keep the jobs they occupied. On the demand 
side, intrinsically paternalistic employers hoarded labor and rejected any downsizing [Commander, 
Schankerman, 1997; Commander, Tolstopyatenko, 1997; Friebel, Guriev, 2000].  
Certainly, this may have been true of some workers as well as some managers. However, 
there  is  little  evidence  that  this  argument  could  explain  much  of  the  adjustment  process.  For 
example, persistently high worker turnover is hardly supportive of this theory.  
In fact, worker turnover in Russia was much more buoyant than in the other post-socialist 
economies for which detailed data are available [Cazes, Nesporova. 2001; Employment Outlook, 
2002]. This resulted in a high proportion of short-tenured workers and a low average tenure. As 
Lehmann and Wadsworth noted [Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2000], these were ―tenures that shook 
the world‖. Gross worker turnover measured as the sum of hirings and separations across all firms 
made up 43-62% for the whole economy and 45-65% for industry. As Fig. 6 suggests, in the 90s 
stability of employment was achieved largely by keeping hiring at high levels, not by low separation 
rates.  Firms  could  easily  downsize  proportionately  to  the  output  fall  by  slowing  new  hiring. 
Meanwhile, even in the hard times of the 90s, the hiring rate remained at a high level of 20-25% 
(relative to average annual employment) thus contributing to relative stability of employment.  
Workers’  separations  from  firms  were  (and  are)  mostly  voluntary  (at  least  they  were 
registered as such) and this fact looked paradoxical as well. Involuntary separations (firings) were 
relatively rare even when the crisis was the most acute. Those fired made up not more than 1-2.5% 
of all employed in firms or 4-10% of all those actually separated (due to any reasons). Voluntary 
separated (quitted) workers made up 16-25% of all the employed or 65-80% of all the separated.  
In sum, available empirical facts provide little support to the hypothesis that stability of 
employment was generated by low worker turnover and by the ―mutual attachment‖ of workers and 
managers. Employment remained relatively stable not because of managers who were unable to 
displace workers and not because of workers strongly opposing any displacement. The actual rate of   6 
labor turnover would have allowed for any employment level. Therefore, some other forces must be 
at work here.  
Two other interconnected factors may offer more plausible alternative explanation. These are 
flexible working hours and flexible wages.  
Flexible Working Time 
For the first 5 years of the transition, the annual duration of working hours in the Russian 
economy was shortened by 12% (Fig. 7). In industry, the decrease made up 15%, or about one 
seventh  of the  annual  working  time.  From the mid-90s  on, the duration of  working time  grew 
rapidly,  increasing  by  2008  by  about  6%  in  the  whole  economy  and  about  16%  in  industry. 
Fluctuations in hours had a magnitude comparable to that in employment (Fig. 1). If hours had been 
stable, the change in employment would have been twice as large as that observed in the crisis and 
in the recovery, other things equal.
7 By contrast, in the CEE countries the cyclical dynamics of hours 
were much more muted.  
There were multiple reasons for hours to shrink so significantly. In the early transition period 
(late 80-early 90s), the Russian authorities used legislative cuts of working hours as social and 
political cushions against mounting hardships. At that time, they had few resources to appease the 
population facing accelerating inflation and income losses; so free hours were considered a kind of 
social transfer. The normative duration of the working week was shortened from 41 to 40 hours, 
minimum holidays were lengthened from 18 to 24 days, additional days of national holidays were 
introduced, and additional categories of workers got the right to work shorter hours (for the same 
salary/wage). These social reasons were soon complemented by economic factors that forced firms 
to cut hours further.  
Firms soon realized that cutting hours was one of the cheapest ways to adjust labor costs. 
They did this in two major ways. They shifted their personnel into administrative leaves (unpaid or 
partially paid holidays) or into short-time work. Use of these schemes reached a peak by the mid -
90s, when 5-7% of workers were on short-time work and 2-3% went on forced vacations.
8 (Every 
                                                 
7 Since these estimates refer to the formal sector, they may overstate actual fluctuations in hou rs 
worked. Partially, losses in hours here could be compensated through moonlighting or involvement 
in the informal sector activity. 
8 Workers on forced leave were subjects to partial compensation which was often withhold due to 
poor enforcement of this legal norm. This cut down costs associated with the use of forced vacations 
and stimulated further dissemination of this practice.    7 
year  in  that  period,  6-15%  of  workers  experienced  short-time  work  and  8-15%  suffered  from 
involuntary leaves.) Flexible hours allowed firms to avoid mass downsizing. Instead, they resorted 
to shortening working hours for a large portion of the employed population.  
However, in 1999 the return of growth changed the trend and the use of short-hours schemes 
began to shrink very fast. In 2007, less than 0.2 millions workers were affected by short-time work 
or were sent to unpaid vacations. This constituted less than 0.5% of all workers employed in Russian 
firms.  Fast  recovery in  working hours and the  wide use of overtime work limited employment 
growth in the boom period.  
Flexible Wages 
Shorter  hours  brought  labor  costs  down  but  not  enough  to  accommodate  the  GDP  fall. 
Downward wage flexibility did the rest.  
During  the  90s,  the  real  wage  lost  cumulatively  around  two  thirds  of  its  initial  value, 
demonstrating thus a ―great contraction‖ (Fig. 1). Deflating the average wage with alternative price 
deflators provides more modest estimates showing that real wages ―just‖ halved [Wages in Russia, 
2007] but the sheer fact of a drastic fall is not debated. In any case, the fall in real wages outpaced 
that in GDP, thus bringing the fraction of labor compensation in GDP down markedly. The restart of 
economic growth in 1999 launched a steep recuperation of real wages. Inflation remained rather 
high but nominal wages grew even higher. As a result, during 1999-2007 the real wage grew by 10-
20% annually and cumulatively tripled over this period!  
The wage adjustment was achieved in a few ways. The first one was by means of high 
inflation,  which  eroded  real  wages  since  nominal  ones  were  not  subjected  to  any  automatic 
indexation. Freezes of the nominal wage or its slow increases during multiple and prolonged periods 
of high inflation resulted in fast devaluation of real labor costs. The largest falls in the real wage 
always coincided with inflation hikes when nominal wage growth rates lagged far behind CPI rates. 
Indeed, as can be seen from Fig. 10, ―the great wage contraction‖ was mostly achieved in three big 
leaps which followed major macro shocks. The first was associated with the price liberalization in 
1992; the second one with the so-called "Black Tuesday‖ in financial markets in October 1994; 
finally, the third followed the default in August 1998.  
The  second  way  (to  adjust  the  real  wage  downwards)  was  associated  with  the  specific 
composition  of  the  wage  bill  that  is  typical  for  the  majority  of  Russian  firms.  In  Russia,  a 
considerable fraction of total wage payments is variable and not fixed in labor contracts. This part 
includes  premiums  and  bonuses  that  can  fluctuate  within  a  wide  band  contingent  upon  general 
economic conditions and firm performance. (We will discuss institutional properties of the wage   8 
setting  system  in  more  detail  in  the  next  section).  Linking  a  significant  fraction  of  workers’ 
compensation to firm performance makes the total wage contingent upon changes in output. In case 
of  downturn,  the  wage  payment  shrinks  almost  automatically,  thus  containing  total  labor  costs. 
Meanwhile,  workers  are  likely  to  enjoy  an  additional  premium  in  the  upturn.  As  a  result,  this 
fraction of wage compensation moves procyclically. As Table 1 documents, in the crisis ridden year 
of  1998,  the  most  flexible  part  of  the  wage  made  up  on  average  27%,  while  in  much  more 
prosperous 2007 it reached almost 36%. A similar regularity is observed across sectors and firms 
(Table 2). For 2005, in the most prosperous oil/gas extraction and metallurgy sectors, the premium-
type variable fraction (including tariff-related regional allowances) made up58% and 52% of the 
total wage bill! Even in the over-regulated and largely state-run education and healthcare sectors this 
constituted a quarter and a third, respectively. (Reference to the US?)  
Table 1 
Composition of wage bill by components, 1995-2009, %* 
Years  Proportion in the total wage bill: 
Tariff   Regional allowances   Extra payments, premiums 
and bonuses 
Other payments 
1995  53,0  15,8  28,2  3,0 
1998  52,4  14,9  27,3  5,4 
2000  49,2  15,1  32,7  3,0 
2002  50,1  14,1  32,9  2,9 
2005  47,8  14,2  35,1  2,9 
2007  49,2  12,1  35,6  3,2 
2009  52,5  11,4  33,3  2,9 




Composition of wage bill by major components, some sectors, 2005, % 
 
Sector 
Proportion in the total wage bill: 
Tariff (inc tariff-related regional 
allowances) 
Extra payments, premiums and bonuses (inc tariff 
related regional allowances) 
Oil and Gas   42,0  58,0 
Metallurgy  48,4  51,6 
Machine-building  53,7  46,3 
Food Industry  63,7  36,3 
Electricity, gas and 
water supply  52,1  47,9 
Construction  65,2  34,8 
Retail and Wholesale 
Trade  74,2  25,8 
Transportation  59,8  40,2 
Education  75,7  24,3 
Healthcare  65,3  34,7 
Source: Rosstat. 
   9 
The third approach to wage adjustment was paying late. Wage arrears grew explosively over 
the 90s and were widely discussed in the research literature [Clarke, 1998b; Desai, Idson, 2000; 
Earle,  Sabirianova,  2000;  Earle,  Sabirianova,  2002;  Earle,  Sabirianova,  2004;  Lehmann, 
Wadsworth, 2001; Lehmann, Wadsworth, Acquisti, 1999]. They emerged in early 1992 and peaked 
in mid-1998. At that time, about two thirds of all wage and salary workers were paid late. In real 
terms, the accumulated value of arrears increased by tenfold from the start to the peak (Fig. 9). In 
1992-1993, the stock of unpaid wages amounted to under one fifth of the monthly wage bill; by the 
end  of  1998  it  accounted  for  over  1.5  times  the  monthly  wage  bill  [Wages  in  Russia,  2007]. 
However, as soon as the economy returned to the path of economic growth wage arrears began to 
dissipate  rapidly.  By  mid-2008,  they  made  up  under  2%  of  the  monthly  wage  bill,  while  the 
proportion of workers affected was less than 1%. In other words, delaying wages appeared (for 
firms) as an efficient instrument of wage flexibilization during the crisis and virtually disappeared 
when the crisis receded. 
Finally,  firms  might  (and  in  fact,  they  did)  use  informal  (undeclared)  payments.  This 
increased wage flexibility even further. The unofficial part of wage payments made up around 50% 
of the official (declared) wages and stayed practically constant over the whole period [The Russian 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues]. These payments not bound by any formal constraints were 
especially sensitive and responsive to any change in labor demand and reacted immediately. 
In downturns, simultaneous use of all these instruments (inflationary depreciation of real 
compensation, cuts in premiums, wage arrears and shrinkage of shadow wages) contained labor 
costs and made mass downsizing not vitally important. Workers losing earnings activated their exit 
behavior. As a result, employment adjustment was allowed to proceed gradually and sharp outbursts 
of open unemployment were prevented. As Boeri and Terrell noted about labor market adjustment in 
the CIS region, ―… the flexibility of wages clearly did matter… The tremendous decline in wages in 
the former Soviet Union helps explain why employment declines in these countries early in the 
transition process were relatively muted, while the lesser decline in wages in central and eastern 
Europe  helps  explain  why  adjustment  in  these  economies  took  the  form  of  larger  declines  in 
employment‖ [Boeri & Terrell, 2002, p.60]. When the economic situation tended to improve, firms 
could minimize using these instruments and, therefore, they raised the payable wage. Again, positive 
shocks were met by (positive) wage fluctuations but not by any sizable changes in employment.  
The  contrasting  behavior  of  wages  and  employment  is  well  illustrated by  Fig.10,  which 
presents their monthly dynamics over 1991-2009. If the former reacted immediately to any shocks, 
the  latter  remained  largely  insensitive  and  unaffected.  The  dotted  broken  line  for  real  wage   10 
dynamics reconstructs in detail the drastic ups and downs in the Russian economy throughout the 
transition. By contrast, looking at the smooth line for employment, one could hardly imagine those 
dramatic events that went one after another during the period. A standard textbook view would 
suggest that the picture should be rather the opposite. 
Did the 2008-09 Crisis Change the Mode of Adjustment? 
The 2008-09 economic crisis can be considered an additional robustness test for the model. It 
reduced Russian GDP  by  7.9% in  2009 and called for  a large adjustment in  the labor market. 
Institutional changes in the Russian economy (including the ongoing battle of the government for 
―better enforcement‖, persistent increases in administrative pressure on business, the retirement of 
the old generation of paternalistically oriented "red directors" etc) coupled with substantially lower 
inflation might raise doubts that behaving in the old way would be feasible for most firms. Against 
these expectations, available evidence suggests that key labor market indicators tended to behave 
largely as before.  
Indeed, total employment declined only by a modest 2.2% in 2009 (Fig. 1). (True, in the 
corporate sector net job losses were somewhat larger – 3.5%; the difference can be attributed to the 
fact that the outflow from the corporate sector was partially absorbed by the informal sector and 
indicates the high shock absorbing capacity of the latter.)  
As for unemployment, it grew from 6.4 to 8.4%, or by 2 pp, in 2009 compared to 2008 (Fig. 
3). The difference between the peak and the trough monthly values (seasonally adjusted) was larger 
and amounted to 3 pp (Fig. 11). However, already from the middle of 2009, general unemployment 
tended to go down; it reached 8% by the end of that year and fell further to 7% by the end of 2010. 
Change in registered unemployment was more dramatic (Fig. 11). It grew from 1.8% for the pre-
crisis peak to 3.1% for the crisis trough (these are seasonally adjusted monthly values), which meant 
an increase in claimant unemployment by almost 70%. However, this jump was caused partially by 
institutional factors, including a sharp rise in value of the unemployment benefit (UB) and easer 
access to them in early 2009. Moreover, even with this additional inflow the level of registered 
unemployment  remained  low  for  any  phase  of  the  business  cycle,  the  acute  crisis  being  no 
exception. Again, the fall in employment and rise in unemployment appear disproportionately mild 
compared to the depth of the new output contraction.  
A closer look into worker turnover shows which factors were likely to be responsible for the 
observed employment reduction. Paradoxically, in the crisis-ridden year of 2009 total separations 
were even less numerous than in the economically favorable year of 2007: these were 30.5% against 
31.3%, respectively (Fig. 6). In contrast to separations, total hiring decreased markedly from 31.0%   11 
in 2007 to 26.2% in 2009. This illustrates the regularity already observed: given the high rate of 
worker turnover, Russian firms can effectively downsize just by temporarily freezing new hires 
without active use of involuntary labor shedding.  
The composition of outflows from jobs was also puzzling since the crisis did not bring many 
more layoffs. In 2009, these accounted for merely 7% of total separations and affected only 2% of 
the workforce. Moreover, the number of collective dismissals almost did not change and concerned 
under 0.5% of the workforce, as in the pre-crisis period. Therefore, Russian firms facing a demand 
shock  kept  avoiding  layoffs  while  using  –  as  they  did  before  –  alternative  cost  containment 
instruments and approaches. 
One  of  these  alternatives  concerns  changes  in  working  hours.  The  underemployment 
overhang in 2008-09 generated by the discrepancy between changes in GDP and employment was 
of the scale that was observed in the mid-90s. In 2009, the annual duration of working hours per 
worker in the economy was less than in the previous year by 2.4%. The difference was 4.8% in 
industry  and  6.2%  in  manufacturing,  all  due  to  expansion  of  various  well-known  short  hours 
regimes (Fig. 7). In the beginning of the crisis about 20% of the workforce, in 7 major sectors of the 
Russian  economy  for  which  monthly  statistics  are  available,  worked  shortened  weeks  or  took 
involuntary or quasi-voluntary leave. This expansion was driven largely by employers’ initiative and 
many workers had to accept this option, given the lack of better alternatives.  
What was the wage response? Did it continue to demonstrate striking downward flexibility? 
Not as much as during the transformational recession of the 90s. Two major constraining factors 
were at work here. First, inflation, though it remained relatively high, was much lower than that 
accompanying the previous crisis episodes. For this reason, its contribution to the depreciation of 
real  wages  was  much  more  modest.  Second,  the  state  increased  enormously  its  administrative 
pressure on firms trying to prevent any use of wage arrears. Though this instrument was still in use, 
the scale was very limited (Fig. 12). After a small increase in the first crisis months, wage arrears 
soon started to dissipate and already in 2010 returned to their pre-crises level.  
However, other instruments ensuring wage flexibility remained in action. In late 2008-early 
2009, cuts in nominal wages by 10-20% were observed in most parts of the private sector, while in 
others they were effectively frozen. In nominal terms (!) wages (seasonally adjusted) decreased in 
Construction (F) and Financial  Intermediation  (J) by 21%, in  Manufacture of Mineral  Products 
(C23) –  by 15%, in  Transport Manufacturing (C34)– by 10%, in  Metallurgy  (C27), Machinery 
(C29), Manufacture of Wood and Wood products (C20)– by 8-9%, in Transportation (I) – by 7%, in   12 
Wholesale and Retail trade (G)– by 6%, in Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical products (C24) 
and Manufacture of Electrical Products (C31) – by 4-5%.  
Though the nominal wage started to rise soon, it lagged behind inflation. This resulted in a 
real wage decline of 3.5% in 2009. By contrast, the real wage growth before the crisis was about 10-
15% annually over almost 10 years (Fig. 13).
9 This shift from growth to decline was impressive by 
any standards (OECD, 2011), though it may not imp ress Russians much, given that the macro -
shocks in the 90s caused real wage cuts of 25-30%. 
Table 3 decomposes labor market adjustment during the 2008/09 crisis by major factors. It 
suggests that employment, working hours, and wage adjustments made compara ble contributions. 
Again, the employment decline was much less (by three times) than it would have been had hours 
and wages not changed. Employment to output elasticity stayed within the same range as in the 90s. 
As already mentioned, while GDP declined by   7.9%, employment fell by just  1.7%; industrial 
output fell by a very impressive 10.0%, while industrial employment downsized by 5.9%; output in 
manufacturing decreased by a quite dramatic 15.8% while its employment shrank by 7.2%. So, each 
pp of output de cline in the economy at large brought employment down by 0.2 2  pp, while in 
industry this was by 0.46-0.59 pp. 
 
Table 3. Annual changes in output, employment, working hours and real wages, 2009 to 2008, 
percentage points 
  Output  Employment  Working hours  Real wages 
Total economy  -7.9  -1.7  -2.4  -3.5 
Industry  -10.0  -5.9  -4.8  -5.7 
Manufacturing  -15.8  -7.2  -6.2  -7.2 
 
This simple analysis suggests that ―the Russian model‖ is more alive than dead though in a 
slightly  modified  form.  Once  again  the  Russian  labor  market  demonstrated  its  ability  to 
accommodate major negative shocks without large losses in employment and drastic increases in 
unemployment.
10 This does not mean, however, that this persistent adjustment mode is close to the 
optimal, given all welfare and productivity related considerations. 
                                                 
9 The wage dynamics we observe seemed to be partially distorted by state intervention into public 
sector wage setting. In 2009, the Russian Government raised salaries in the sector by 30%. Without 
this, the overall real wage decline would be much larger.  
10 Reactions to the economic crises of 2008-09 in many developed countries (for instance, Germany) 
differed from those used previously. Hours adjustment as a way to mitigate shock and to contain 
unemployment became quite popular [Cahuc P., S. Carcillo, 2011].    13 
 
3.  Institutional Foundations of the Reverse Employment/Wage Asymmetry  
If wages and employment behave as described above, one may expect that these outcomes 
are  effectively  shaped  by  the  acting  labor  market  institutions.  In  order  to  channel  firms’  and 
workers’  behavior  in  this  direction  there  must  be  an  institutional  framework  that  slows  down 
employment adjustments but leaves wage fluctuations largely unconstrained.  
This raises a big question: do the Russian labor market institutions trade off employment 
against  wages?  If  yes,  then  how?  These  institutions  are  usually  strongly  interconnected  and 
complementary; therefore, their effects on employment cannot be easily disentangled from their 
effects  on  wages.  Employment  effects  of  regulations  are  usually  much  more  pronounced  when 
wages are sticky; otherwise, flexible wages may decrease some adverse impacts on employment 
[Lazear, 1990, p.702]. However, keeping all this in mind and preserving a high level of generality, 
we can say that employment protection legislation (EPL) is largely ―responsible‖ for allowing (or 
not)  employment  fluctuations,  while  minimum  wage  and  wage-setting  institutions,  as  well  as 
regulations governing unemployment benefits (UB), affect wage outcomes.   
The choice of a particular wage-employment trade-off is a political economy problem and 
reflects particular social and political preferences. In Russia, this institutional choice seemed to be 
made early in the transition and was path dependent in relation to the late Soviet period.  
Employment regulations  
Institutionally, the scope for employment flexibility is largely determined by firing costs 
introduced by the employment protection legislation (EPL). On the one hand, high  firing  costs 
contain quantitative fluctuations and introduce additional inertia into employment. On the other, 
equilibrium employment under high firing costs appears to be lower than it would otherwise be 
[Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990; Heckman, Pages, 2003].  
In Russia, the EPL constituted an important part of the labor legislation accumulated in the 
Code of Laws on Labor (KZOT). This code was initially developed in the specific context of the 
central planning system, was in force throughout the 90s, and, with multiple partial amendments, 
continued to operate until 2002. Its major explicit objective was to limit flows of workers in the 
state-owned economy, which was chronically ridden by labor shortage. The updated Labor Code 
came  into  effect  in  early  2002  and  was  amended  further  in  2004  and  2006.  Though  some 
contradictory and obsolete requirements were abolished, the EPL part of the Code changed little. 
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Born  as  a  hard  political  compromise,  it  basically  inherited  multiple  rigidities  from  the  old 
legislation.  
The picture of the Russian EPL can be summarized briefly by using various integral EPL 
indices that allow cross-country comparisons. Existing indices tend to confirm that the Russian EPL, 
as written in the law, should be considered very stringent. The World Bank in its ―Doing Business‖-
2007 survey estimated the rigidity of employment (rigidity of hirings, firings, and working hours) in 
Russia,  assigning  44  points  against  30.8  for  the  OECD  on  average  [World  Bank,  2007].  The 
deviation from other countries is even stronger if we refer to indices suggested by [Botero et al., 
2004]. In this case, Russia earns a value of 0.83 against the median value of 0.44 (these scores relate 
to the 90s when the old KZOT was still in force). This ranked Russia first on the list of the countries 
with the most rigid EPL. The OECD tends to evaluate the Russian EPL as flexible, though it admits 
excessive rigidity in relation to short-tenured workers on permanent contract [OECD, 2010]
11. Job 
protection for permanent workers gets a score of 2.8 against 2.1 (on the OECD scale) for the OECD 
average. Just three OECD countries (Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia) have a higher 
index on this dimension.  
Some ambiguity in the evaluation of nominal EPL strictness for Russia relates to the use of 
fixed-term (FT) contracts and temporary work agencies (TWA). Though some consider the Russian 
legislation with relation to FT contracts extremely flexible, their legal use is strictly limited by a 
closed list of exceptions. Courts, if law suits are filed, tend to take the work ers’ side and alter the 
contracts to make them permanent (open-ended) contracts. Since the RF LC includes no provisions 
concerning TWA activity, some experts interpret this as a nearly laisser-faire regime. However, it 
would be more correct to say that the use of TWA work is de facto prohibited by the law although 
this prohibition is often poorly enforced. 
Minimum wage  
The  minimum  wage  sets  a  wage  floor  and  can,  therefore,  constrain  downward  wage 
flexibility. In Russia, during most of the transition period, the minimum wage was fixed at a low 
level and was hardly binding for the majority of firms in the economy. Indexation was irregular, 
lagged far behind inflation, and had a short-run effect on relative earnings. The evolution of the 
minimum to average wage ratio is presented in Fig. 14. It was usually less than 10% and fell under 
                                                 
11 Some recent studies also consider the Russian EPL flexible or even extremely flexible. However, 
we believe that they mi sinterpret some elements of the Russian legislation. For their critical 
appraisal see (Kapelyushnikov, 2011).   15 
5% for some time in 1999-2000. Starting from Jan 1, 2009, the minimum wage  almost doubled in 
nominal terms from Rbl 2,300 to Rbl 4,330. Initially the ratio increased to a quarter of the average 
wage, but it decreased again since then. During the whole transition period, it was much lower than 
in the EEC. 
Why was the Russian Government so committed to a low minimum wage policy? A few 
considerations might simultaneously be at work here.  
First, this could be motivated by fiscal constraints. In the 90s, multiple social benefits were 
tied to the minimum wage and any increase of the latter gave an  impetus to inflation of social 
spending. Second, any rise in the minimum wage (abbreviated in Russian as MROT – ―minimal pay 
level‖) shifted upward the whole pay scale in the public sector, thus also inflating total spending. 
Recall that in the 1990s the general government budget was running a large deficit, though it turned 
into surplus by the mid-00s. Third, the enormous heterogeneity of the Russian regions implied that 
any large increase in the minimum wage could severely lower employment in the most depressed 
regions. Since the average wage in better performing regions was more than three times higher than 
in the worst performing regions, the MROT equalled a mere 15% of the average wage in the first 
group (such as Moscow or Tyumen) but might easily exceed 50% in the second (containing the 
autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, among others).
12  
Taken together, these considerations might explain why the Government stuck to a policy of 
a low minimum wage. It initiated upward adjustments only when it considered this politically 
beneficial. As might be expected, such moments usually coincided with approaching elections.  
Unemployment benefits 
Another upward pressure on the wage floor can be generated by unemployment benefits 
(UB) since these also tend to affect the reservation wage and ultimately the whole wage distribution. 
Russia entered the transition having no open unemployment and consequently no social protection 
                                                 
12 Until 2006, MROT was set by the federal authorities at the level that was uniform for all regions. 
According to 2006 amendments to the Labor Code, in addition to the federal MROT, each region 
should introduce its own  - regional - minimum wage not lower than the MROT. By the time of 
writing, we had no hard data to evaluate an impact of this new norm. Some regions refrained from 
raising regional minimum wage level above the MROT level, others raised it not substantially, still 
others raised it but with significant exceptions. One of the highest minimum wages was in Moscow 
but even here it made about 25% of the average wage.  
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targeted at the unemployed. The safety net to cushion emerging social costs had to be created from 
scratch and without delay. Its designers were caught between expectations of high unemployment 
and fears of being too generous. Such fears were warranted given the Polish experience in the early 
transition. As already mentioned, fears of very high unemployment did not come true, while the 
safety net emerged with multiple loopholes and was far from generous. Throughout the 90s, the 
share of annual GDP budgeted for labor market policies remained remarkably low. It constituted 
less than one-half of 1 percent, while expenditures of this sort in Hungary or Poland reached 1.3 and 
2.25 percent, respectively (UN Commission for Europe, 2003). In the 2000s, this share became 
almost negligible. Total spending on passive and active labor market policies remained less than 
0.1% and it only approached 0,2% in the crisis 2009 due to additional spendings.  
In this context, the UB level was unable to act as an effective wage floor. Its evolution (Fig. 
15) tells us basically a story similar to that of the minimum wage. The average UB to average wage 
ratio reached a peak of 30% in 1998 but subsequently declined gradually. It was under 10% before 
the 2008 crisis. The increase of the maximum UB value to 4,900 Rbl in late 2008 did not change the 
ratio  significantly.  Low  UB  levels  and  the  lack  of  job  vacancies  at  the  disposal  of  the  Public 
Employment Service (PES) discouraged job-seekers from applying to this agency and contributed to 
low claimant unemployment. Again, the combination of fiscal constraints and heterogeneity in the 
regional labor markets tied the hands of government with regard to any significant  upward UB 
adjustments.  
Summing up, in Russia the wage floor has always been (and still is) effectively low for 
various reasons. If wages tended to decline, the low wage floor did not prevent deep falls. 
Two-tier wage structure  
In Russia –in both the private and public sectors – the individual wage typically has a two-
tier structure. The first part (tier) is fixed (basic, tariff-based) and rigidly contracted, while the other 
one is variable and therefore flexible.
13 As Table 2 illustrates, it is large in all sectors including the 
public one. As mentioned earlier, the variable part includes various bonuses or wage premiums 
which in sum indirectly reflect financial performance of the firm and, since performance may vary 
over time (and across firms), it tends to grow in good times (and in good firms) and shrink in bad 
times (and in bad firms). The public sector (containing public universities and schools, hospitals, 
museums, research institutions, etc, which are funded from the federal or local budgets), though 
                                                 
13 Here we do not mean th at the variable part is informal and is paid ―in an envelope‖. If this 
informal component in a particular job exists, it adds the third and the most flexible component.    17 
heavily regulated by the government, follows basically the same two-tier wage-setting logic as the 
private sector. Here, the variable part is linked to revenues of regional/local budgets. If the latter get 
richer, public sector workers (funded from these budgets) enjoy higher earnings, other things equal 
[Wages in Russia, 2007] 
The  large  and  persistent  variable  component  in  the  two-tier  wage  structure  works  as  an 
automatic risk-sharing device in the face of high uncertainty in the market environment [Bigsten et 
al., 2003]. This assumes an implicit contract between risk-averse workers and managers who appear 
also to be risk-averse. In other words, a significant portion of labor market related risks is shifted 
onto workers.  
Trade unions and wage agreements 
Trade  unions  (TU),  if  they  are  numerous  and  powerful,  constrain  wage  flexibility.  TU 
usually bargain for wages but leave some room for managers to decide on employment adjustment 
(governed by the EPL).  
A superficical glance at the Russian labor market would suggest a very rigid corporatist 
arrangement inherited from the Soviet past. If to judge using conventional measures, the wage-
setting in Russia seems to be highly centralized and coordinated [Cazes, 2000]. It has a multi-layer 
bargaining structure with the Tripartite Commission on the top (adopting national level tripartite 
agreements), industry level tariff agreements between employers’ associations and sector-specific 
trade unions, and in addition tripartite agreements at regional level.
14 Within this framework, firms 
would seem to be completely constrained in their wage policy; almost no room is left for either 
upward  or  downward  decentralized  wage  adjustments.  However,  this  conclusion  would  be 
completely misleading since it ignores important nuances concerning the functioning of the system. 
As already mentioned, over one third of the total wage is not contracted at all and remains 
contingent upon performance. Additionally, TU initiatives (at any level) are easily blocked by the 
government and are accepte d only if the government agrees. This makes the whole corporatist 
structure largely decorative and shallow [Ashwin, Clarke, 2002; Clarke, 2007; Denisova, Svedberg, 
2007].  
TU density, which was close to 100% at the start of the transition, has eroded gradu ally, 
though in the corporate sector it still remains rather high.  The major TU (abbreviated as FNPR in 
                                                 
14 In 2010, there were 61 industry-level and 75 regional level agreements while the total number of 
firm level collective agreements was around 170 thousands (FITUR reports).    18 
Russian or FITUR in English)
15 claims to represent about  70% of workers  in large and medium 
sized firms. How many of these members exist on paper only re mains, however, a big question  
[Ashwin, Clarke, 2002]. In the 2000-s, annual losses in membership made up around 5% or 1 
million members, as reported by FITUR. Outside the segment of large and medium sized firms 
(employing about 50% of all employed in the economy) the TU do not seem to exist at all.  
The low level of union voice and mobilization capacity derives partially from structural 
changes within the labor force. Among these were the employment shift from large-scale industry to 
the service sector, where small firms prevail; the growing non-unionized sector; rising heterogeneity 
and the segmentation within the unionized sector.  
High wage inequality in the unionized sector, the two-tier wage setting system (with a large 
upper tier), and low strike acti vity are clear indicators of low TU capacity. Otherwise (if the TU 
were stronger and more influential), one might expect to see lower variation in wages, a smaller 
variable part (if any) in the wage structure, and higher frequency of strikes across the eco nomy 
compared to that observed at any moment during the period.  
Efficiency of enforcement  
This is one of the key features making the Russian labor market what it is. Any discussion of 
the impact of regulations on labor market performance usually implicitly assumes that laws and 
contracts are fully enforced. If this is not the case, actual outcomes can deviate markedly from what 
is normatively expected. Incomplete enforcement is typical for many countries and the transition 
economies are salient in this respect. On the one hand, weak enforcement deregulates the labor 
market; on the other hand, it increases uncertainty for firms and workers 
In this regard, the Russian case is of special interest due to the high heterogeneity of the 
country and the lack of a tradition of obedience to the law. As M.Saltykov-Tchedrin
16 put it in the 
XIX century, ﾫthe stringency of Russian laws is offset by their non-observanceﾻ. Non-observance of 
laws and rules is a key element of the observed flexibility.  
Weak enforcement (which reflects weak capacity of the state) concerns all major wage and 
employment regulations. As already discussed, wages are not paid on time and in full, the variable 
part of wage payments is usually not fixed by a contract, working hours may be shorter than the 
                                                 
15 Alternative TU are not numerous and their activity is concentrated in a few narrow sectors or even 
firms. 
16 Attributed to М. Saltykov-Tchedrin (a famous Russian writer (1826-1889), who also served as a 
vice-governor in one of the provinces of the Russian Empire).   19 
bottom  limit  permitted by law or much longer than the upper limit,  the minimum  wage is  not 
binding,  firings  are  substituted  by  semi-voluntary  quits,  just  to  mention  a  few  examples.  The 
systemic imitation of strong governance does not prevent the adjustment from proceeding beyond 
and despite formal rules. This may explain the puzzling association between stringent regulations 
(on paper) and remarkable flexibility (in practice).  
Poor observance of the law is well recognized by all labor market agents, as illustrated by 
data  from  a  specially  organized  survey.  According  to  this  survey,  the  proportion  of  enforcers 
believing that EPL observance does not pose any problem is strikingly small. This opinion is shared 
by just 3% of the judges, 8% of the employers’ representatives, and by 3% of the TU regional 
leaders that were surveyed. None of the surveyed labor inspectors or the PES top officers took this 
position.  If  measured  on  a  7-point  scale  with  the  maximum  given  to  complete  observance,  the 
Russian regions vary from 2.3 to 5.0 points. Most of the averages are under 4 points, while the 
employers only assign just a little more than that [Gimpelson et al, 2010].  
In the early 2000s, the Russian authorities announced far-going plans to bring ―more law and 
order‖ into all areas of economic life, including the labor market. In the context of these measures, 
not paying wages on time became a serious crime punishable by imprisonment, for example. This 
helped to curb the wage arrears epidemic but brought little law obedience in other areas. On the 
contrary, firms began to seek ―refuge‖ in less regulated and not so well monitored areas.  
Obviously, such extralegal (beyond the rules) adjustment creates an uneven playing field and 
generates uncertainty for firms and workers. Gimpelson et al (2010) documents that in Russia EPL 
enforcement varies significantly across regions,  localities, and firms. This paper  argues that the 
variation in enforcement across regions is translated into variation in labor market performance, if 
the endogeneity of enforcement is accounted for. Stricter enforcement raises EPL costs, other things 
equal, affecting employment negatively and unemployment positively. Inter alia, this implies that 
the EPL is  stringent enough, if the formal  regulations are thoroughly  applied. The cost  of this 
stringency would be in lower employment and higher unemployment than was actually observed.  
In practice, the active bypassing of the formal rules by firms contained the costs of labor 
turnover. Firms could easily get rid of some workers or decrease wage costs for others and, at the 
same time, this allowed them to hire new workers with little fear of getting stuck with these workers 
(and associated costs) in case of a sudden downturn.  
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4.  Political Economy Perspective  
Fig.  16  summarizes  schematically  the  modus  operandi  of  the  Russian  labor  market  and 
illustrates why adjustments on the price margin (through wage) or the intensive margin (through 
working  hours)  might  dominate  adjustments  on  the  extensive  margin  (through  the  number  of 
workers).  However,  for  this  modus  operandi  to  persist,  major  agents  (workers,  firms  and  the 
Government)  must  expect  that  associated  benefits  exceed  total  costs.  For  workers,  fear  of 
unemployment, weak voice, and uncertain outside options help reconcile them to wage cuts. Firms 
are ready to accept this system because it enlarges their adjustment space and allows the shifting of 
some labor market risks to other parties. Key benefits for the government in this model can be seen 
in  containing  unemployment,  which  was  considered  a  serious  threat  to  ―social  and  political 
stability‖,  and  in  the  possibility  to  delay  structural  reforms  that  might  have  brought  more 
unemployment. Thus workers, firms, and the government each have their own reasons for favoring 
this model. 
As analysis for Russia and other countries demonstrates, fear of unemployment may have a 
strong impact on workers’ behavior. If workers are afraid of unemployment, they are more likely to 
accept  flexible  wages.
17  Ultimately,  employment  in  thi s  case,  inter  alia,  can  be  higher  than 
otherwise  would  be  the  case.  In  Russia,  such  fear  has  always  been  very  strong  against  the 
background of low UBs and the impotent PES. Using household survey data for 1994-2008, we 
documented that Russian workers express very strong fear of losing their job and, if this happens, of 
not finding a new one of similar quality [Gimpelson, Oshchepkov, 2010]. Fear indexes for Russian 
workers are much higher than those in the OECD countries, but are close to those observed in Latin 
America.  
Strong  and  persistent  fear  may  have  important  and  far-reaching  implications.  First,  fear 
works to remove the source of fear. Containing wage costs, it helps to keep unemployment at a 
lower level. Secondly, fear of unemployment may create demand for populist policies including the 
further  strengthening  of  job  protection  regulations.  More  protective  rules,  in  their  turn,  bring  a 
reduction in formal jobs and, therefore, lead to a new fear spiral. This vicious circle is hard to 
break.
18 The third point relates to prospects for institutional reforms more generally. The Russian 
                                                 
17  Blanchflower, 1991. On Russia: Gimpelson, Kapeliushnikov and Ratnikova, 2003; Linz and 
Semykhina, 2008. 
18 There is an analogy with relationships between trust and demand for regulation. As (Aghion et al, 
2010) argue, low trust societies are unable to solve many emerging problems and demand, therefore,   21 
authorities are afraid of social protests and therefore may opt for freezing any reforms that are likely 
to activate displacement.  
Another implication of the Russian model is that individual exit strategies strongly dominate 
collective voice. On the one hand, workers’ voice remains weak, due to the low political influence 
and mobilization capacity of trade-unions; on the other hand, intensive labor turnover implies the 
popularity and availability of exit.  
Strikes in contemporary Russia are extremely rare; activity was somewhat higher in the 90s, 
but then declined in the 2000s with the return to the growth path and virtual disappearance of wage 
arrears (Clarke, 2007). Even more important, there was no revival in strike activity during the 2008-
09 crisis, despite a visible deterioration in wage and employment conditions for a large part of the 
labor force.
19 Occasional protests of workers in mono -industrial towns that were sparked  by the 
crisis (and which attracted significant public attention at the time) were relatively quickly and easily 
neutralized by focused governmental interventions. The problem here is not just that voice has been 
weak (as it, in fact, has) but that the exit strategy for workers seems, on average, to be much cheaper 
in relative terms.  
The redistributive implications of this model differ from those incurred by the model that 
uses quantitative adjustment. The latter assumes that workers are fired in bad times and are hired in 
better times. Those fired (and then hired) bear a major burden (or gain, consequently) but this group 
is relatively small, while "stayers" remain almost unaffected. As a result, costs and benefits are 
highly concentrated. In contrast, the Russian model tends to spread adjustment costs over a larger 
part of the labor force. This derives from the fact that lay -offs are relatively rare while wage 
decreases or hours cuts in crisis times affect almost everybody (though to different degrees). If  a 
median  voter’s  preferences  are  shaped  significantly  by  fear  of  unemployment,  he/she  may  feel 
happy that unemployment has passed by with little impact. A symmetric picture emerges in the 
growth episodes when the employment creation in the formal sector of the economy remains frozen 
or even negative but wages increase quite fast and across all sectors and firms. Here the median 
voter belonging (so far!) to the segment of large and medium size firms would again feel happy.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
for more governmental regulation. More regulation, especially if it fails (what happens frequently), 
tends to destroy trust. As a result, low trust leads to more regulation and we get full circle.   
19 Partially this could be explained by multiple stipulations hindering initialization of strikes, which 
were introduced in the new 2001 Labor Code.   22 
There are also a few reasons for firms to make a similar choice. First, they have an almost 
automatic built-in stabilizer working through procyclical movements in labor costs. Firms can easily 
rely on this option since they feel little competitive pressure to modernize or restructure (otherwise, 
they  would  be  forced  to  restructure  their  manpower  keeping  competitive  wages).  Second,  as 
suggested  by  surveys,  enterprise  managers  consider  layoffs  as  a  very  costly  and  conflict  prone 
adjustment measure. These perceptions may also shape – other things equal – preferences for price 
adjustment, leaving layoffs as a last resort option. Third, this model does not exclude quantitative 
adjustment, but channels it into the mechanisms of individual quitting or shifts it beyond formal 
regulations. 
As for the government, it feels quite satisfied with this model largely because unemployment 
tends to stay at a low level. This minimizes possible political risks associated with quantitative 
adjustment given that strong fear of unemployment is so widespread in the Russian society. In 
addition,  low  unemployment  contains  the  fiscal  costs  associated  with  social  protection  of  the 
unemployed. Last but not the least, the impressive wage growth across the board in upturns is likely 
to be translated into high Presidential and Government approval ratings [Treisman, 2010].
20 
This coincidence of preferences among major actors forms a robust institutional equilibrium 
strengthening path dependence and making a retreat from it difficult and costly. 
5.  Conclusion: A Balance-Sheet of Pros and Contras  
What  is  the  resulting  pay-off  generated  by  this  model?  The  emerging  balance-sheet  is 
ambiguous. Since actual gains and losses produced by this type of labour flexibility are closely 
intertwined and hard to disentangle, its welfare implications turn out to be mixed. 
On the positive side:  
= the labour market has been performing unexpectedly well if one judges on the basis of all 
major quantitative employment and unemployment indicators. Russian-style flexibility allowed for 
keeping employment and participation rates high enough while unemployment never approached 
                                                 
20 This might also explain a key political approach of the Government to managing the 2008 -09 
crisis – to provide a short-term shelter (whatever it costs) – to the public from the full pain of the 
crisis. Financial resources previously accumulated allowed to mix policies targeted at supporting 
employment and at retaining wages in large firms and the budgetary sector.  
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any dramatic levels. This model helped to weather the storm of the early transition and to avoid 
mass displacement in all consequent crisis episodes; 
= from the macroeconomic point of view, low unemployment has positive fiscal externalities 
(contained budgetary expenditures on unemployment protection);  
=  from  the  social  perspective,  adjustment  time  for  individuals  and  households  was 
significantly  stretched,  allowing  them  to  avoid  joblessness  and  to  retain  social  ties,  while 
guaranteeing  them  minimal  income,  etc.  Large  scale  social  conflicts  associated  with  mass 
displacements were avoided; 
=  low  productivity  workers  are  not  ousted  from  the  labor  market  and  may  look  for  an 
alternative job, preserving low paid employment; 
=  the  prevalence  of  individual  exit  strategies  over  collective  actions  worked  as  a  shock 
absorber, partially containing social tensions and keeping them in hidden form. Social conflicts did 
not become open and large scale even against strong macroeconomic shocks.  
On the negative side: 
= the Russian model does not facilitate enterprise restructuring. On the contrary, it helps to 
save old jobs at the cost of creating new ones. Supporting (in various ways: through wage arrears or 
unpaid  leaves,  by  blocking  lay-offs,  etc)  inefficient  firms  it  keeps  them  afloat,  preserves  large 
segments of low productive and technologically obsolete jobs. Slow job destruction, in its turn, 
impedes and slows down job creation in the corporate sector [Brown, Earle, 2002]. Creation of 
informal and low-productivity jobs even in large numbers does not solve the problem of stimulating 
enterprise restructuring;    
= high wage flexibility increases poverty within the working population, generates inequality 
among employed and educated workers, deprives people of formal/institutional social protection, 
and destroys social cohesion;  
=  a major price paid for maintaining a high level of employment is a low average wage, 
which protects formal employment and substitutes for formal unemployment benefits. Low wage 
jobs can be supported by moon-lighting activity and engagement in low productivity employment in 
the informal sector. All this leads to inefficient utilization of human capital; 
=  low  transparency  in  the  labour  market  and  strong  informational  asymmetry  in  job 
vacancies and individual productivity. Searching for a job or entering paid employment in this type 
of  the  labour  market,  an  individual  faces  high  uncertainty  since  he/she  cannot  foresee  future 
earnings. This increases individual search and adjustment costs, including moral costs associated   24 
with search behaviour, generates voluminous and inefficient churning (short-term job matches), and 
negatively affects the efficiency of labour reallocation;  
= survival of numerous loss-making firms produces inefficient matching: many workers stay 
at jobs where they don't have comparative advantages in productivity while search for such jobs is 
costly and very slow;  
=  high  labor  turnover  weakens  incentives  for  further  investment  in  the  human  capital, 
including  on-the  job-training  provided  by  firms.  Instead  of  investing  in  specific  human  capital, 
employers prefer to hire job candidates with better general human capital, which is often considered 
the only reliable labour market signal;  
=  incomplete  law  and  contract  enforcement  opens  room  for  opportunistic  behavior  of 
employers and makes shifting adjustment costs onto workers easier (through wage arrears, ousting 
redundant workers through quits without severance pay, etc);  
=  devaluation  of  formal  labor  contracts  generates  low  trust  behaviour  and  shortens  the 
horizon for decision-making with detrimental consequences for the rule of law. The state loses the 
ability to be an arbiter trusted by all parties. It itself violates formal rules and ―spoils‖ other agents 
as well.  
The general conclusion from this balance-sheet is that the Russian labor market helps to 
buffer various shocks but is not friendly to restructuring and to coping with competitive pressures. 
However, since labor market outcomes are determined by many powerful factors outside the labor 
market  per  se,  one  can  speculate  that  the  Russian  model  was  the  best  available  in  the  given 
circumstances  of  the  deep  recession,  macroeconomic  and  political  uncertainty,  and  unfriendly 
institutional environment. The choice of this particular model was highly inertial at all stages of the 
transition period. Its conservation at the stage of economic growth contributed to distorting and 
slowing down the restructuring process. All that suggests also that the partial positive implications 
of the model emerge as a second best outcome from the actual circumstances and policies.  
The Russian labor market institutions are – as we can see – complements; they form an 
institutional  equilibrium.  In  the  given  institutional  environment  major  market  agents  emerge  as 
beneficiaries.  This  makes  the  model  robust  to  occasional  interventions  and  brings  strong  path 
dependence.  It  has  survived several  shifts in  macroeconomic regimes,  a few attempts at  partial 
reform,  and  four  external  macroshocks.  Despite  all  this,  its  modus  operandi  has  changed  little. 
Moreover,  some  adjustment  mechanisms,  which  had  seemed  to  disappear  under  governmental 
pressure or during the growth episodes, came back as soon as a new crisis emerged. Such path 
dependence  makes  radical  restructuring  of  the  institutional  core  of  the  model  a  formidable   25 
challenge.  In  order  to  solve  the  equation,  the  government  should  move  simultaneously  in  two 
different  directions.  On  the  one  hand,  labor  market  regulations  need  to  become  simpler,  more 
transparent and less costly for major actors. On the other, enforcement of laws and contracts should 
be improved radically. These strategies should complement each other, being two sides of the same 
policy. The Russian experience suggests that reforming the model from above does not work well. 
However, if large-scale domestic and foreign investment would have come in to set up enterprises 
across the country to take the place of the dying enterprises and to bring new technological and 
organizational know-how, then its gradual reformatting could emerge from below. But the chances 
this can be achieved in the mid-term perspective are slim. Therefore, the specific features of the 
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Fig. 1  
GDP, Employment, Real Wage and Working Hours in the Russian Economy, 1991-2010, % 




Evolution of Employment-population ratio, 1992-2009 (population 15-64 years old) 
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Fig. 5 
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Fig. 7 
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Fig. 9 
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Fig. 11 
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Fig. 13 
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Fig 15 



















































How the Russian Model Works: A Stylized Picture 
Avoidance of mass 
layoffs and involuntary 
firings
Weak workers’ voice 
(weak bargaining power)
High share of the variable 
part in earnings
―Non-standard‖ pay (incl 
wage arrears)
Variable part is linked to 
firm performance 
Low wage floor (minwage 
and UB)
Fixed (tariff-based) part 
is linked to MinWage
High flexibility
Wages (price adjustment)
Wage non-transparency Lack of any coordination






Intensive hiring, quits 
dominate
Weak enforcement
 
 
 